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Foreword 
This  publication  is  a  summary  of  a  four-hundred  page  report  commissioned  by 
the French Senat  for their Committee  on Finance in May  1990. 
Due  to  the  wide  interest  that  this  study  has  already _generated,  it  was 
decided to make  its conclusions more  readily available by  preparing  a  summary 
which  has  been translated into English,  German,  Italian and Spanish. 
The  original  report  was  prepared  by  a  group  of  experts  from  the  Centre 
d'Etudes  prospectivee  et  d'informations  internationales,  the  Observatoire 
franr;ais  des  conjonctures  economiques  and  the  Institute  for  Fiscal  Studies, 
and the  summary  was written by  Georges Chevallier of the Senat. 
The  Senat  has  kindly  given  the  publication  rights  for  this  summary  to, the 
European  Centre  for  Parliamentary Research  and  Documentation  and  any  comments 
relating to this report should be addressed to: 
John Wittenberg 
Vice  Chairman 
working  Group  on  Macroeconomic  Research 
European Parliament 
Statistical Service 
L-2929  Lu~embourg 
(FAX:  (352)  43  40  71) 
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1  BRIEF  SYROPSIS 
I.  COMPARATIVE  ~AL~SIS OF  NATIONAL  OOKPUJI"....SORY  DEDUCTION  SYSTEMS 
The  expe~ts paid particular  interes~ to the-economic  impact  of the disparities 
in  the  level  and  structure  of  compulsory  deductions  from  one  country  to 
another.  In  this  connection,  they  set  out  certain  •macroeconomic 
equivalenpes.  which  prompt  them  to  play  down  the  real. impac_t  of  apparently 
important differences: 
1.  From  a  macroeconomic  point  of  view,  employees'  social  insurance 
contributions can  e~fectively be equated with  an· income tax deducted at 
source. 
2.  There  is no  correlation between  the  volume  of  empl!Jyers'  _contributions 
and  the  proportion of  the value  added  by  firms  accounted  for  by wages: 
for  example,  despite  employers'· contributions  which  are  double  their 
German  counterparts,  French  firms  do not devote  a  greater proportion of 
their  added ·value  to  wage  and  welfare  coste  than  do  German  firms; 'in 
the case  in point,  higher contributions are offset by  lower  wages. 
3.  The  experts  show  that  once  the  'surprise .effect'  has  worn  off,  a  rise 
or  fall  in  VAT  rates  is  passed  on  to  firms  roughly  one  year  later: 
this  is  the  result  of  the  relationships  observed  between  wages  and 
prices. 
Comparing  worker  tax  rates  in  the  various  countri~s,  taking  account  of 
earnings  and  family  situation,  the  experts  show  that  the  wide  diSparities 
which  emerge  if  such  comparisons  are  restricted to  income  tax  in the strict 
sense  of  the  term  become  much  less  marked  if social  ~nsurance contributions 
based  on wages  are included. 
As  regards  corporate  taxation,  the  experts  calculated  the  rates  of  return 
required before tax in order  to  secure  a_  5\  return after tax in term.s  of both 
the country where the  investment is made  and the nationality of the firm which 
make's  it.  They  derive  from  this  'incentive coefficients'  in  respect  of  the 
export  or  import  of  capital  in  the  various  countries:  for  example,  the 
incentive  to  invest  abroad  is  greatest  in  Germany;,- the  incentive  for 
investment  from abroad is greatest in the United  Kingdom  and  Ireland. 
II.  RECOMMENDATIONS  FOR  HARMONIZATION 
In general  terms,  the  experts  come  down  in  favour  of  harmonization restricted 
to  the  absolute  minimum.  However,  they  also  suggest  adjustments  which, 
without  being  dictated  by  the  completion  of  the  large  internal market,·  would 
make  tax  systems  more rational. 
As  regards  the  funding  of  social welfare,  the  experts take  the view that each 
country may  remain  free to choose the degree of redistribution they think fit, 
on  condition that they  levy  from  households  the extra  resources  which will  be 
required  as  a  result  of  the  ageing of  the  population  in the  coming  decades, 
this being by  far the most  important problem  in their view). 
- 5  -The  eJ!:perts  aee  income  t~ as  the  prime  example  of ·a  i:ax  which  should  not  be 
harmonized. - However,  in  the  name -of  •.rat.ioruali.ty•,  they  advocate  v;arious 
adjustments to this tax,  mainly  in France. 
With regard to VAT,  the experts regard the rate appro>timat:l.one  propose,j by the 
Commission  as  adequate.  ·In most countries _these  approximations  a,hould  have  no 
major  budget  impact •. However,  they  are  raising  aerioua  d.lffic1.1ltied  in 
Denmark,  where  compulsory deductions are very largely based on  only two  taxes: 
VAT  (the yield  from  which· would be reduced by 30\ hy  ho..tmoniza.tion)  an¢L  ir\come 
tax.  The  expl;"rts  a lao  understand  the  objection13  raised by  tne United··  Kingdom. 
to the  abandonment.  of  the  zero  rate,  which  favours  products  "~hich make  up  30'%  . 
of  household  consumption;  they  do  not  regard  its · continued  .application . as 
necessarily  incompatible  with  the  abolition  of  checks  at  intra-Community 
frontiers. 
With  regaxd  to taxes  '"here  there  ia  a  risk of  'competit.ion,- to levy the". le>Weot. . 
tax ratee',  the eltperte go  much  further  in their :recommandat_tona  t  these· cover' 
the taxation of the 'invest!!Jent  inc~  of houeeholda  '(current:  trends are moy.!.ng 
such  income  outside  the  tax  net.,  a  development  which  the  experts  criticize 
from  the  point  of  view  of  social  fairness  and  -economic  rationality)  and 
corporation  tax,  in  respect  of  which  the  experts  propose  both  a  complet~ 
standardization  (the  only  means  of  ensuring  thai:  the_ tax  doe~  not :.vary 
according  to  the·  location  of  investments  through01.1t  the  commun-ity)  'and  a 
reworking  of  the  mechanisms,  partly  'in  order  t~  make  borro~ing  less 
attractive. 
In the  ~ong term,  the  experts  envisage  that the  tax  on  the  investment  income 
of  households,  corporation  tax,  in  full  or  in  part,  e.nd  taxes  op  pollution 
will  become -c~mmunity eywn  resources. 
III.  SIMULATIONS 
Simulations  carried  out  with  the  aid  of  the  MIMOSA  model  illustrate  the 
macroeconomic  impact of certain tax harmonization measures  in Europe: 
1. ·  Wit.h  regard  to VAT  and the taxation of petroleu.m  _products,  the :experts·· 
put.  fc)rwat·d  a  scenario _  whi.ch  {Joes  beyond  thei~  ~wn  recommandatiqns,. 
since  it  simulates  complete  harmonisation·  wit~'l  accompanying  me~sures' 
ge&red  to· the  specific  situation  of  each  country;  the  impli~ation  is 
that  tax  adjustments  which  have  such  a  strong  impact  on  prices  are 
dangerous  and  should be  staggered. 
2.  Another  scenario  simulates  a  reduct.ion  in  employera•  social·· insurance 
contributions  in  the  three  countries  where  rates  are  high-er  than 1the 
·community  average  (Spain,  France  and  Italy)  with,  by  way  of 
· compensation,  an  increase  in  deductions  from. households:  only  Italy 
benefits clearly  from  this  scenario,  which  is  shown  to·hav'<'.)  an  adverse 
effect on economic  growth  in the Community as  a  whole. 
- 6  -I.  LEVEL  AND  STRUCTURE  OP  COMPULSORY  DEDUCTIONS  IN  EUROPEAN  COUNTRIES 
A.  overall tax take 
The  overall  rata  of  compulsory  deductions  (income  tax  and  social  insurance 
. contribut·ions)  is  an  accounting  indicator.  The  conventions  employed·  in 
calculating it vary  from  one country to another.  In order to make  comparisons 
possible,  the  OECD  calculates  harmonized  rates  (Table  No.  1)  which  differ-by 
varying  degrees  from  those  which  appear  in  the  national  accoun~s ·of  e~ch 
country  (Table  Mo.  2):  the  difference  is  particularly  marke!i  in  Germany 
(41.2%  under  the  national  accounting  system  and  37.6%  under  the  OECD  system) 
and  in  Spain  ( 30.9%  and  · 33%  respectively).  One  of.  the  main  differences 
between  the  accounting  conventions  employed  concerns  social  insuran~e 
contributions  (Table  No.  ~)  which,  in order  to  be  classified by  the  OECD  a~ 
compulsory  deduc~ions,  mu~Jt  be  both  legally  compulsory  and  paid  over  to  ~ 
public body. 
In  1987,  the  most  recenif  year  ~or  which  OECD  statietics  a:r:e  availatile), 
compulsory  deductions  reares~nted,  on  average,  39.6%  pf  tl)e  GDP  of  t.he 
European  community:  33%  in  Spain,  36.2\  in  ltal~,  37.5%  in  the  .unit94 
Kingdom,  37.6%  in Germany  and  44.8\ in France. 
By  comparison with 1965,  the average  increase was  10%  over the Community  as  a 
whole  ( +  6%.  in Germany,  +  7. 1%  in the United Kingdom,  +  10.3%  in France, 
+  10.6%  in Italy and+  18.5%  in Spain). 
B.  Compulsory  deductions,  public  expenditure,  the  budget  deficit  and  the 
public debt 
The  differences  between  deduction  levels  from  one  country  to  another  can  no 
doubt  in part be  traced back to accounting conventions.  In particular,  since 
the total for deductions  is not  •consolidated•,  the taxes and  socia!  insurance 
contributions which  administrations pay o_ver  to each other give rise to  doub~e 
accounts  whose  scope  is  not  necessarily  the  same  in  each  country.  State 
intervention  by  means  of  tax  allowances  reduces  the  burden  of  compulsory· 
deductions,  but this is not true of  intervention by means  of subsidy. 
However,  above  and  beyond  these  accounting  phenomena,  four  factors  must  be 
taken  into-account. (see Table  No.  2):  the level of the public  secto~ deficit, 
the burden of  interest charges on the debt  accumulated in the past,  the extent 
of  the  income  redistribution  carried  out  by  the  social  security  authorities. 
and  the  level  of  other  .public  expenditure  (administrative ·,and  capital 
expenditure). 
1.  Public sector deficit and public debt 
Given  the  same  level  of  public  expenditure,  a  country  which  runs  a  higher 
budget  deficit  than  another  will  enjoy  lower  income  _from  compulsory 
deductions,  However,  this represents  a  •temporary  trade·~off• which,  sooner or 
later,  will  force  the  country  with  the  higher  deficit . to  increase  its 
compulsory  dedu~tions or greatly reduce its expenditure other than on interest 
~barges  in  order  to  cater  for  the  increase  in  those  charge~.  Table ·No.  2 
shows that this scenario corresponds to the P9Sition of Italy. 
- 7  .;.. -Conversely,  a  state  ( euc!'1  ae  Bel~ium or -~k)  _ which  seeks  to  ;ceduc~ . the 
debt  accumulated  in the past muat,  given the sa,roe  level of  pubU.c  expenditurei 
impose  a  higher  ra·te of cornpulrwry  dsductlone  ·than  a  country whos0  public d-abt 
ie  small1~r. 
Table  Non  4  gives  detaila  of  the  ~lie debt  in  the  varlo1.1e  :E:uropaan 
countries.  Working-from this,  a  liat. can be dra,.m up of those countries whoae 
past  budget.  policies  a.rt:;:  now- imposing  tight  constraints- on  fut~.\re  go•.re,rnment 
action:  this  applies  both  t.o  countries  where  compulsory  _deductions  -arEi 
currently  lower  than the  Community  average  {Italy or Greece,- f.or  exampl~)  and 
countries  where  these  deductic;:me  are  already  h.tgh _(Belgiuf!l,  the  ~Netherla!l<;l.a 
and  Denmark). 
Table  No.  5  refines  thia  analyaia  by'  empfoying- t:he  coo.cep~. of ,  t.he  'primacy 
deficit•  (or  •primary  suz:P.lua•)  which  r~presenta  the  budget. def.icit  m.inus 
interest charges  (the  'deficit net of interest•). 
As  an  lnitial  approximat·iqn,  it can  be  stated  t.hat  vhen- real  interest· rate,s 
are  equal  to the  rate  of  ~rowt;h. of  GtlP,  t.he  achievement  of· a  budget · baiimqe ; 
net  of -interest  charges  is  esaentld if the .ratlo  be.twee~ -the  ..;ol••.  of  tne  ·. 
public debt-and the level of GDP  is to be stabilized. 
However,  thie is not enough  in the curren1:  si.tua.tion where  rea-l  l.nterest rat;e? 
are  higher  than  the  rate  of  growth  of  GOP.  ln order _to  stabilize the public' 
debt/GOP  ratio,  the  budget -must  Ghow  a  - •pri.i:tl&~  surplus• ·\v-hich  depends;  in 
each  coun1:ry,  -on  the  leve)l  of  interest  rates,  the  rate- of  groWth  of  Got:;·  ~-~d' 
the· volume  of the public debt. 
In  tne  1 ight  of  all  these  factors, -the  experts  calculated:the  volume· of.j.ile 
prilrl.ary  s;urplus  r~ired in  each  country  in  order ·to  stabilize  the  publi_c 
debt/GOP  ratio. 
Three groups_ of countries can be  distinguishe~; 
the , Unit~  Jr.ingdom  and  Denm:ark~  where  budgetary  eon  sol  i'dat ion- ha1s.'  gone 
beyond  the. primary  surplus  requll.:ed  to  ata.bili.ze  the·  debt  ~·atlo  .:(-these' 
cot:mtries  are  curre~tly showing  a  relati.ve fall in their  indebt~dnees)  ;, 
Germany.  France,  Ireland and  Belgium,  countries where the  effectiv~·primarr· 
surplus and the surp,lue  required roughly coincide; 
the. Netherlands and,  above all,  !tal)( and  Gr.eace,  where  f¥rthe:i:  effol;'~E( ar~ 
required  in order to  stabili~e the public debt ratio. 
Spain  is  at _ a  ha.l fway  house,  in  that  its . low  public  cabt  and  fast 'rate  o~ 
~  '  ,.  ,...  ' ,•, 
growth currently limit the  requir~d adjustment to less than erie  GDP'perc:e~tage 
point  .. 
Jn  the  c_ase  of  Italy,,  Belgium.  the  Netherlands,  !reland &nd-:G,.·eece_,. a  fall in, 
the debt  rat;io,  rather than 1nere  stabilization t-vould  be  nf~cesaary in, order'.·to·,.,, 
restore  some  room  for  manoeuvre  in budget;  pOlicy. 
2.  Social  transfers 
The _extent  o!  the  incom~ redistribution achieved  by  means'of  soc~al tr.anafers 
·is  a  key  :fau.::'i::or  in  the  differences  observed  in  the'  l'evel  of  compulsory '. 
- 8  -deductions  in  the  various  countries: 
Netherlands  on  one  hand  and  Germany 
correlation  emerges  between  the  level 
compulsory deductions. 
for  example,  taking  Prance  or  the 
or  Spain  on  the  other,  a  certain 
of  social  benefits  and  the  level  pf 
However,  the  'social  benefits'  column  in  Table  No.  2  provides  only  partial 
clues  in this  connection.  For  example,  the  particularly  low  level of  social 
benefits  in  the  United  iU.ngc:loiiD  and  Denmark  can  in  part  be  explained  by  the 
fact  that  health  services  are  paid  for  from  public  funds,  whereas  elsewhere 
they are  funded  by private insurance. 
Moreover,  it is probable  that,  as  far  as  economic  analysis  is concerned,  the 
level  of  expenditure  on  health  eervices,  or  the  level  of  pensions,  is  in 
itself more  important  than  thg method of financing this expenditure.  This  is 
why  Table  Mo.  6  sets  out  the  results  of  a  calculation  made  by  the  OECD 
concerning  expenditure  on  pedical  care  in  the  main  countries.  In  1987,  thls 
expenditure  represented  6.~% of  GDP  in the  United  Kingdom,  7.2\  in Italy,  8% 
in  Germany  and  8.7%  in  Fr~ce,  as  against  11.1%  in  the  United  States.  With 
regard  to  this  last  figure,  it  should  be  noted  that  public  expenditure  on 
medical  care  accounts  for-only  6%  of  GOP  in  the  United  States,  i.e.  a  level 
comparable with that of the other countries. 
By  the  same  token,  Table  No.  3  shows  that  a  proportion of the social benefits 
received by households  is not  paid  over to them  by  the public authorities but 
by  private bodies:  this proportion is lower  in  France  (1.7%  of  GOP)  than  in 
Germany,  Italy or the United Kingdom  (4.5\ of GDP). 
3.  Public expenditure on  administration and infrastructure 
The  third column  of  Table  No.  2  shows  that,  expressed  as a  percentage of  GDP, 
total public expenditure in the European countries ranges  from  37%  in Spain to 
53.8%  in  the  Netherlands  (via  40.8%  in  the  United  Kingdom,  43\  in  Germany, 
46.6\ in France  and  46.8%  in Italy). 
Taking  only  government  expenditure  on  administration  and  infrastructure,  the 
differences  are  much  less  marked  and  the  countries  appear  in  a  different 
order:  17.7%  of  GOP  in Spain,  22.2\  in Italy,  22.6\  in France,  23.8%  in the 
United  Kingdom  and  24.2%  in Germany. 
- 9  -c.  Structure of compulsory deduction= 
Table No.  7  classifies compulsory deductions  according to the economic  nature 
of their  assessment  basis.  It thus  d:i.stinguishes  between  taxes on the i,ncome 
of  households  (income  tax  itself  and  social  insurance  contributions  paid  by 
households),  corporate  income  (corporation  tax),  labour  costs  (essentially 
employers•  social  insurance  contributions),  other  production  costs  and, 
finally,  product prices  (mainly VAT  and excise duties). 
First  and  foremost,  this table  reveals  the  peculiar  nature of  ~he Danish tax 
system,  a  good half of whose  revenue is generated by  income tax and a  third by 
VA.T  and excise duties. 
A  comparison  restricted tq  the  five  main  oountriae  of  the  community  prompts 
the  following conclusions. ' 
Income  tax in the  narrow  s~nse,  the revenue  from  which  corresponds on average 
,I 
in  the  Community  to 9.6\  9f  GDP,  is less  burdensome  in  Prance  (5.7\  of  GOP) 
and  in  Spain  (7%)  than  in Italy  (9.5%),  the United lti.Dgdcm  (10%}  and  Carmany· 
(10.9%). 
If one  adds to this tax the social  insurance contributions paid by households 
(essentially  employees),  it  emerges  that  overall  deductions  levied  on  the 
income of households represent on average 16\ of  GOP  in the Community  and that 
the  differences  between  countries  do  not  exactly  correspond  to  those  in 
respect of  income  tax  in the narrow  sensez  Spanish households  face the  lowest 
tax  burden  (10.3%  of  GOP);  the  deduction rate is  13.3%  of GDP  in Italy,  13.9% 
in  Pr~  and  15.  7%  in  the  United  Kingdom;  it  is  considerably  higher  in 
Germany  (18.4%  of GDP) • 
. corporation tax plays a  relatively limited role:  1.9\ of  GOP  in Germany,  2.2\ 
in  Spain,  2.  3%  in  France,  3.  8%  in  Italy  and  4%  in  the  Unit~ Kingdom,  the 
community  average being 2.8\. 
The  contributions  which  add  to  labour  costs  (8.2\  of  GDP  on  average  in  the 
Community)  are particularly  high  in  France  (13\  of  GDP)  and particularly  lo~ 
in  the  United  Kingdom. (3.5\  of  GDP),  where  employers•  social  ben3fit 
contributions  are  relatively  unimportant.  They  represent  7.2\  of  GDl?  in 
Germany,  8.9%  in Italy and 9.1\ in Spain. 
Taxes  affecting product prices are higher  in France  (12.7~ of  GDP)  and  in the 
United  Kingdom  (11.1\  of  GOP)  than  in  Spain  (9.7%  of  GOP),  Germany  (9.1~)  or 
Italy  ( 9. 1\)  • 
In overall terms,  Italy and Germany  have compulsory deduction structures close 
to  the  Community  average,  whereas  Prance,  Greece,  Ireland  and,  above  all, 
Denmark  have structures which depart considerably from  the norm. 
D.  Real  economic  impact of compulsory deductions 
The  classification  of  deductions  in  accordance  with  the  economic  nature  of 
their  assessment  basis  which  has  just  been  examined  must  not  be confused with 
their  real  economic  impact  because,  wherever  possible,  every  economic  agent 
endeavours  to  pass  on  to  others  the  fiscal  burden  imposed  on.him.  For  the 
economist,  the  important thing is to discover who  the tax is ultimately pa~eed 
on to and the consequences of this.  Two  questions are central to this1 
- 10  -is ·the tax ultimately passed on to households or firms? 
does  the tax alter the  L~lative coat of production factors  (capital and 
labour)? 
Any  analysis  of  these  feed-·through  phenomena  must  take  into account the  time 
factor. 
1.  Tho  short  tarm 
In  the  short  term,  one  can  say  that the economic  impact  of  taxes  corresponds 
to the classification given  in the preceding paragraph.  If  VA~ ia increased, 
this  immediately  reducee:  the  purchasing  po\oorer  of  households.  If  employers• 
social  insurance  contributiomll  or  corporation  tax  are  increased,  company 
profits will be the first  ~ffectea. 
2.  In  the medium  term 
Once  the  •surprise  effectr  has  pa~»Bed,  how  do  economic  agents  react  to  tax 
changes? 
The  outcome  of  the  chain  reactions  caused  by  a  tax  change  which  hae  a  direct 
impact  on  production  costs  or  consumer  prices  essentially  depends  on  two 
factors: 
whether,  and  how  quickly,  firms can paaa on the increase in their costs 
to producer prices; 
the sensitivity of nominal  wages  to the  increase in consumer prices. 
This  second factor deserves attention,  because it determines the real economic 
impact of changes in VAT. 
Even  if wages  are not  automatically indexed to prices,  this does  not  mean  that 
the  past  or  anticipated  inflation  rate  ie  not  in  fact  taken  into  account  in 
wage  negotiations.  Generally,  a  change  in the  inflation rate is refle~ted to 
varying  degrees,  and  more  or  less  rapidly,  in  wage  trends.  For  exan1ple,  a 
recent  study  by  INSEE  (National  Institute  for  Statistics  and  Economic 
Research)  concludes  that  in  France  a  price  change  is  passed  on  to  nominal 
wages  at a  rate of roughly  75%  and with an average delay of six months. 
Chain reactions of this type  show  that a  reduction in VAT  works to the benefit 
of  firms  in  respect  of  value-added  gain  sharing  and  an  increase  works  to 
their detriment.  This  is  why,  when  considering  the  medium-term  consequences 
of  a  change  in  VAT,  the  economist  tends  to regard it as  a  tax on  firms  rather 
than on  households. 
3.  The  long  term 
In  the  European  Community,  national  economies  have  been  interdependent  to  a 
considerable degree  for the last thirty years.  Adjustments  in exchange rates, 
methods  of  fixing  wages  and,  in  general 1  market  mechanisms  as  a  whole  have 
absorbed  the differences between the various  fiscal  and social  systems.  Thus, 
in the  long term,  this type of difference is offset by wage disparities,  since 
competition  leads  to  an  approximation  of  production  costs.  The  chapter 
devoted to social insurance contributions will demonstrate this. 
- ll-XI.  SOCIAL  INSURANCB  CONTRIBUTIONS 
A.  Proportion  of  compulsory  deduct!one  made  up  by  aocial  insurance 
contributions 
Tables  Nos.  3  and  7,  considered  above,  provide  general  clues  as  to  the 
proportion of compulsory deductions made  up by social insurance contributions. 
In  1987,  they  represented  13.5%  of  community  GOP,  the  figure  for  total 
compulsory  deductions being  39.6%.  Practically 'non-existent  in Denmark,  they 
reached 19.2\ of  GOP  in Prance,  14%  in Germany,  12.4\ in Italy and 6.8\ in the 
United Kingdom. 
However,  with  regard  to  economic  analysis  it  is  important  to  dra~  a 
distinction  between  employees•  contributions  and  employers•  contributions. 
The  former  differ  littl'  from  income  tax,  at  least  as  regards  their 
macroeconomic  impact.  Thp  latter  add  to  labour  costs:  increasing  them  in 
order to  finance  a  rise  i~ social  benefits  has  the  same  macroeconomic  impact 
as  a  wage  rise. 
In  most  Community  countries,  the  volume  of  employers•  social  insurance 
contributions increased considerably between 1970 and  1980  (Table No.  B)s 
+  4%  of  GOP  in  Spain,  +  2. 6%  in  France,  +  2.  5~  in  Belgium,  +  2\  in  the 
Netherlands  and  +  1.9\ in Germany.  Since then,  their volume  has stabilized. 
With  regard to employees•  contributions,  the  increase was  less marked  between 
1970 and  1980,  but it continued between 1980  and  1987. 
During  periods  of  severe  unemployment,  the  high  level  of  employers'  social 
insurance contributions in certain countries harms economic effectiveness.  In 
France,  for  example,  an  employee  whose  gross  earnings  are  100  costs  his 
employer  141  on  the  same  scale  and  himself  receives  84  as his net salary.  If 
he were  unemployed,  he would  receive  an average benefit of 37.  For the state, 
the cost of his being employed is 84  - 37  = 47,  i.e.  one third of the wage  and 
social cost borne by the firm  (141).  The cost which the firm puts down  to the 
labour factor thus represents three times its cost to t~e state. 
This  explains  why  proposals  are  often made  in France to reduce  the burden  of 
social  insurance contributions on  low wage-earners. 
B.  contribution rates and value-added gain sharing 
Employers'  social  insurance  contributions  are  only  one  component  of  wage 
coats,  wages  themselves  clearly being the main  component,  and it will emerge, 
from  the  arguments  set  out  below,  that  the  countries  where  social  insur'ance 
contribution rates are highest are not those where value-added gain sharing is 
least  favourable to firms. 
Table No.  9  sets out the social insurance contribution rates applicable in the 
main  European  countries,  whilst  Table  ifo.  10  shows  how  the  value  added  by 
firms is shared between: 
on  the  one  hand,  employees•  earnings  (gross  wages  +  employers'  social 
insurance contributions); 
- 13  -on  the other,  company profite  (gross operating surplua)1• 
Putting  these  two  tablee  side  by  side  reveals  just  how  much  caution  m~st be 
~xercised in making  international comparieonst 
~  Italy,  .the  count.ry  with  the  higheet  'employers'  social  i;nsuranee 
contribution  rates,  is  also  the  country  where  wage  costs make  up  the 
smallest proportion of the adaed  value; 
Conversely,  it  is  in  Deruuark  that  wage  costs  ma~e  up  the  highest 
proportion  of  the  added  value,  whereas  firms  pay  rio  social  insurance 
contributions; 
In  Prance,  the  proportion  of  the  value  added  by  firma  made  up  by  wage 
costs  is  comparabl$,  and  even  slightly  lower,  to  that.  in  Germany, 
whereas  the rate  of- employers•  social  insurance contributions  ia twice 
ae  high  in France  (~6.5')  as in Germany  (18%)1 
In  the  United  King4cm,  the proportion  made,  up  by  wage  costa  ita  'higher 
than  in  Garmany  and  Franca  despitG  mubh  , lower  social  insurance 
contribution rates. 
c. Wage  coats and compulsory deductions from wages 
Table  No.  11  sets  out  the  results  of a  calculation designed  to highlight all 
the  compulsory. deductions  (employers'  contributions,  employees•  contributions 
and  income  taxes}  levied from the earnings of  a  ~rker who  receives an  av~rage 
waqe, 'whose wife does not work  and who  has two  children. 
A  comparison  restricted to  the  five  main  countries of  the  pommunity  reveals 
that  the  German  .rorker  is  the  most  expensive,  followed  in  order  by  his· 
1taliim,  French,  British and  Spanish counterparts. 
The  rate  of  compulsory  deductions  on  the  average  worker's wage  is highest  in 
Italy,  followed  by  Germany,  France,  Spain and.the United'Kingdom. 
In this example,  the French worker is alone in not paying  income tax. 
D.  Experts  •  recommendations 
As  already  noted,  the  long-standing  differences  between  national  compulsory 
deduction  systems  have  been  absorbed  by  market.m~chanisms which  tend, 'in· the 
'long term,  to even out the production coste, of competing  f~rms'.  . 
There is,  therefore,  no  need  tQ reduce the established differences in respect 
of social welfare systems or the  'costs borne by  firms'. 
In  the  future,  the  experts  take  thEJ  view  that  the  ageing  of  the  population 
· wi'll  result,  in all European countries,. in an  increase in. welfare coats which 
will create a  need  for  new  resources. 
1  In order not to complicate the argument,  no mention is ~ade here of the 
third  component  of  the  added  value,  i.e.  taxes  on·production  (net  of 
subsidies). 
- 14  -Table Ho.  12 traces likely changes2  in the ratio between the number  of persons 
aged over 65  and the active population.  It will certainly lead to an increase 
in  pensi~n costs,  but  also in health-related ezpenditure,  since a  person aged 
over  65  requires,  on  average,  2.5  times  as  much  care  as  a  person  aged  under 
65. 
In  order to  determine  the  orders  of  magnitude  involved,  the  exper~a set up  a 
scenario  based  on  the  underlying  tre~ds  in  the  French  social  welfare  system 
from  which it emerges that employees•  social insurance contributions should be 
increased by 9• over 30 years. 
According to the experts,  each  country may  remain  free to determine ita level 
of welfare protection on  cpndition that  any increase in expenditure should be 
financed  by means  of  dedu~ions from households  (insurance benefits logically 
being  financed  from  soci41l  insurance  contributions,  whereas  supplementary 
benefits should be  finance~ from  income tax). 
If  any  increase  in  employprs•  social  insurance  contributions  is to  be  ruled 
t 
out,  should  they  be  reduc~d in those countries where  they are highest?  This 
would offer those countriep  a  means  of  pursuing  a  competitive disinflationary 
policy,  whereas  the  rules  of  the  European  Monetary  System  preclude 
'competitive  devaluations'~ 
Table  Ho.  13  sets  out  the  results of  a  simulation,  conducted with the aid of 
the  MIMOSA  model,  tracing  the  impact  of  a  1•  annual  reduction  in  employers' 
social  insurance contributions in France,  Italy· and Spain.  To  offset this,, an 
increase  in  deductions  on'  households  was  ase~ed  (income  tax  or  social 
insurance deduction on overall income)3•  · 
only  Italy  benefits  clearly  from  the  simulated  measures  which  have  a 
restrictive overall effect on European growth·as  a  whole. 
In  fact,  the  conditions  for  the  success  of  a  policy  of  'competitive 
disinflation• are almost the same  as for  a  'competitive devaluation'a 
Domestic  demand  must  be  squeezed  in  order  to  increase  the  exportable 
surplus  (a condition met  in the simulation by the rise in income tax); 
Exporters  must  not  benefit  so  much  that  they  are  able to widen  their 
profit margins and the volume  of  exports must  increase more  than their 
value  falls  (the  sensitivity  of  exports  and  imports  to  price 
competitiveness is particularly marked only in the case of Italy); 
It is vital that several countries do not pursue the same  policy at the 
same  time  (a condition not met  in the simulation). 
2  The  reader  is  reminded  that  forecasts  of  this  kind  are  based  on  the 
hypothesis of sustainable control of migratory  flows. 
3  In  the  case  of  France,  the  simulated  measure  would  correspond,  for 
example,  to  the  progressive  assumption  by  the  state  of  the  cost  of 
financing  family  allowances  offset  by  a  social  insurance  deduction  on 
the overall  income of households 
- 15  -:II:I.  :IHCOKB  TAX 
This  section will first deal with the general characteristics of the taxation 
of the income  of households in the countries of the Community  before moving  on 
t:o ..  the  more  specific  problem  of  the  taxation  of  iDcama  fraa  lnvaatmants  in 
securities. 
A•  General characteristics of income taxation 
Table  Bo.  7  shows  the  revenue  from  income  tax  in  the  countries  of  Europe 
expressed  as  a  percentage  of  GDP.  The  income  tax/Community  GDP  ratio  has 
risen  from  6.1\  in  1965  to  11.2\  in  1987.  The  majority  of  this  increase 
occurred in the 1970s. 
The  experts'  report  touch~s on  many  topics  which  cannot  be  summarized  here: 
allowances by virtue of pr+ncipal place of residence,  allowances in respect of 
professional  expenses,  al~owances  specific  to  employees,  other  ~llowances, 
taxation of couples  and me.sures to taka account of children. 
This- section  will  merely  compare  the  average  tax  rates  and  summari'ze  the 
experts'  conclusions. 
1.  comparison or  average rates of t&Katlon of ~loysss 
In  all  the  countries  of  the  Community,  progressive  taxation  is  applied  by 
means  of  a  sliding  scale  in  which  successive  income  bands  are  taxed  at 
increasing  rates  (Table  Bo.  14).  Germany  has  an  original  systemz  the 
marginal tax rate is an  increasing monotonous  function of the level of income, 
the  number  of  bands  therefore  being  virtually  infinite.  certain  countries 
prefer  a  very  large  number  of  bands  1  others  employ  only  three or  four. , , The 
trend  is now  towards  the  reduction  of  maximum  rates.  They  range  between  40\ 
in the United Kingdom  and  68\ in Denmark.  The  Prench rate is not particularly 
high  if one  takes  account  of the fact that it must  be multiplied by  0.72  for 
employees earning less than FP  50  000 per month. 
The  rate  applicable  to  the  final  band  in  the  scale  is  not  necessarily  an 
accurate  indicator  of  the  proportion  of  the  tax  burden  borne  by  taxpayers 
whose  incomes are high. 
The  experts  calculated  the  tax  paid  in  the  various  countries  by  typical 
taxpayers receiving only earned  incomez  Table Ho.  15  shows  the tax paid by  an 
unmarried  employee  whose  wages  vary  between  70\  of the  average worker's  wage 
and  five  times  that  average  wage1  Table  lfo.  16  takes  the  situation  of  a 
married  couple  with  two  children  where,  by  convention,  the  woman  earns  the 
equivalent  of  70%  of  her  husband's  wager  the  incomes  of  the  couples 
considered in this table thus vary between 1.2 times and 8.5 times the average 
worker's wage. 
Alongside the income tax rate itself, it seemed  interesting to show  a  tax rate 
including all social  insurance contributions  based  on  wages.  These  notional 
tax  rates  lend  themselves  much  better  than  the  others  to  international 
comparisons  since  they  eliminate  -differences  deriving  from  institutional 
choices  in respect of the financing of social welfare systems. 
Por  a  single  man  (Table  No.  15)  receiving a  low  wage,  income  tax is very  low 
in  France,  Spain  and  the  Netherlands  and, very, high  in  Ireland  and,  in 
- 17  -particular,  Denmark.  At  higher  wage  levels,  the  tax  rate  is  low  in  Italy, 
Spain and the United Kingdom  and high in Denmark  and Ireland. 
'"·Incorporating  socJ.al  lilsurance  contribQtJ.ODS  brings -the  deduction ,,rates .. very· 
,.'"'~,(t  ;  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  t  '  '<'  '- '-"''  {  '  ''1'  <I  I'  '  1 
·ii!uch: ·more  closely  into' line, ':·although  ·Spain  and· -the.  United .Ki~g~~·,::.~emain 
appreciably below the average.  The difference between tax  braclietsi·i'~f·g~eatly 
redu~ed&  the deduction  rate varies  rough,ly  between  40\  for  low wage's. ~d,: 60\ 
for  high  wages,  i.e.  a  20-point' diffe.tence,  whereas  for  income  taJl' .~lc:n\8· the 
ga~ ·is·  30  points  in  Belgium  and  ~rmany,  37  in  France  and  ;·45 · in·  th~ 
Netherlands. 
'  . 
" For· a worldng  couple  with  two  childre.n  (.'!'able  JJo;. 16),  the  tax  rate.  ~n the 
narrow  sense  is  low  in  :france,  Italy  and  Spain  and , high  , in  B'~lgJ;~,, and 
Denmark.  If  the  overall  fate  is  taken,  the disparity  narrows  copsi~erably: 
··deductions rise  in step wifh wages  in Belgium  and.''Oenmark,  but. lag  f~r. behind 
t'heill  elsewhere.  '  ,, 
2.  Ex,perts'  conclusions 
Income  tax  is the  prime  example  of 
which  can  remain  an  instrument 
objectives.  The  same'  applies  to 
hoUseholds. 
a  tax  which  should  not  be,  harmonized  and 
for  pursuing  national  econoi,ni:c  , '.poi  icy 
socilill  insurance  contribution; ·:;!Xn:ne  :by 
The  risks  of  workforce  displacement,  including  that  of  the  most.  skilled 
workers,  on  tax grounds  are small.  Gross  wage  levels  and  the cost  o~.~iving, 
in particular of  housing,  are more  important factors. 
This  diagnosis  does  not  prevent  the  experts  from  c putting  forward 
reco~endafions to  improve  the  French· tax  system.  They  ~egard  a·~iie~lng of 
the tax base '(at present,  roughly half of French households pay no ,income  tax) 
·and  collection by deduction at source as desirable.  ,,  ' . 
They  also  observe  that  high · marginal  rates . have  the  drawback '· o'f.  making 
·additional  work  barely  profitable·  . for  skilled,  well-paid  individuals, 
'·highlighting  the  advantages  of  the British  system  where  the  maxiaiWri.  rate is 
lower than in other countries but the intermediate rates higher.  .  :~.  > 
Finally,  the French  system of .family-relate<i reb'atee  ~eaerves to be taken· as  a 
'model,  in the  GXpe~tS' Vi8Wo  •'  I' 
B.  Taxation of household  income fraa iDYestments in securities 
With  regard  to  fundamental  principles,  the experts  challenge the validity of 
arrangements 'in national  tax  systems  which  fa~our income  from  inv~s~mepts in 
securities.  However,· the  fact that  thea~. arrangements  exist and  ~ha~.~apital 
moves  freely  leads  to  a  risk of  •co8lpetition, ·to ·lliipase, the  lowest  .t~., rate• 
which may  give rise to the displacement of. savings~';· 
1.  The  failure of community plans · 
In  outline  form,  two  systems  carr be  conceived of  with  a  view  to  ma~ntaining 
the taxation of  income'from investments in securities in the Communitya 
- 18  -(a)  An identical withholding tax in all the Member States 
The  failure of the attempt to introduce such a  mechanism  in Germany  led to the 
abandonment  of the Community  plan. 
(b)  Taxation of the  bolder of the oapital invested in his or her country of 
residence 
Certain  countries,  in  particular  Prance,  apply  this  system,  but  its 
effectiveness  is  open  to  doubt.  To  be  workable  in  the  long-te~ it would 
require  changes  to the  banking  secrecy rules to  which  certain Member  States, 
notably  Luxembourg,  are  strongly  attached  and  effective  cooperati.oD  between 
national  tax  authorities.  In  addition,  given  the  globalization  of  capital 
movements,  the  main  countfies  in  the  world  financial _system  would  have  to 
reach  agreement  on  an  inteFOAtional-~ of benktng ethics  (the United States 
seem to be advocating such'a move). 
2.  The  drawbacks  inherent ln the non-taxation of investment income 
( 
In the  absence of  a  Community  agreement,  the short-term trend is likely to be 
towards the virtual exemption from tax of the majority of investment  income  in 
the Community.  This trend can be criticized from  several points of view: 
Fairness:  taxation will be concentrated on earned  income  and  property1 
The  financing  of  pension  achellesa  national  tax  incentive  systems 
designed  to  encourage  the  individual  to  save  under  private  pension 
schemes will lose their raison d'Otre, 
-' 
Bconomic effectiveness•  the experts take the view that the taxation.of 
all  income  {earned  and  unearned)  is  preferable  to  the  taxation  of 
earned  income alone. 
In  the  longer  term,  if  a  code  of  banking  ethics  can  be  introduced  at world 
level  the  experts  propose,  with  a  view  to  expanding  the  Community's  own 
resources,  the levying of a  Community taK on unearned  income. 
- 19  -IV.  CORPORATION  TAX 
A.  Main characteristics of the tax systems 
·Ka:  revealed  by  the  comments  on  Table  No.  7,  corporate  taxation  accounts  for 
only  a  fairly  small  proportion  of  tax  revenue.  It  is  important  only  in 
Luxembourg  (because  of the proliferation of  financial  institutions)  and_,  to a 
lesser  degree,  in  the  United  Kingdom·  (particularly  by  virtue of  the  size of 
the profits generated by oil companies)  and in Italy. 
1.  Tax  scale  (Table No.  17) 
Tax  rates  are  generally  high.  They  apply  to  gross  profits  net  of  interest 
and minus  tax write-offs.  In all the countries other than Denmark,  write-offs 
are calculated according t9 the purchase price of the materials.  In order to 
prevent  this calculation rorthod penalizing  firma  during  periods of  inflation, 
the  tax write-off  is more !.rapid  than  the  economic  depreciation,  particularly 
by virtue of the declining'balance depreciation system.  · 
Nine  countries  operate  the  tax  credit  system  with  a  view  to  preventing  or 
limiting the double taxation of shareholders. 
In overall terms, 'the methods of calculating this tax differ very greatly from 
one  country  to  another  and,  for  a  modest  yield,  the  tax  gives  rise  ~.o  many 
administrative  difficulties  which  hamper  the  free  movement  of  capital  in 
Europe. 
2.  The  experts'  criticisms 
The  group  of  experts  voice  many  criticisms  of  the  corporation  systems 
currently in operation.  In particular,  they accuse them of treating interest, 
distributed  profits  and  retained  profits  in  a  different  way  and  thus  of 
encouraging firms to borrow as much  as possible.  The  irrational nature of the 
system is exacerbated during periods of inflation. 
From  the  point  of  view  of  the  effectiveness  of  the  European  economy  as  a 
whole,  the existence of  twelve  national corporation tax  systems gives rise to 
a  situation  whereby  comparisons  of  the  return  on  investments  in  accordance 
with their  location produce differing results  in respect  of  the return before 
tax and the return after tax. 
A  rational  taxation  system  should  meet  two  conditions  of  neutrality  in 
connection with the location of the investmenta 
neutrality  in  respect  of  the  ezport  of  capital:  a  firm  must  be 
subject  to  the  same  taxation  regardless  of  the  country  in  which  it 
invests;  in  this  way,  the  choice  of  where -to  establish  a  subsidiary 
abroad is not  influenced by taxation; 
Neutrality in respect of the  import  of  capitals  the tax rate must  be 
the  same  for  all  firms  established  in  a  given  country  whatever  the 
nationality of the parent company. 
Table Ho.  18  takes the example of multinational companies planning investments 
on  which  they wish to secure  a  s• return after tax.  The  table shows the pre-
- 21 ·-tax  return  required  according  to  the  country  of  origin  of  the  firm  and  the 
country in which the investment is made. 
It  emerges,  for  example,  that  in  respect  of  investments  in' France;· Danish," 
German  and  French  firms  are.  8_ubject  to :the  lowest .tax  rates~  whereas, Italian 
and  ·Irlsh  f'irms  are  ~he  ''highest-taxed •..  COnversely,  ·French  flrms  are  best 
advised to invest  in Ireland,  then  i:n  J'raric'e1  they are very highly. taxed when 
they invest in Germany. 
Table  &o.  19  shows,  for  each  country,- the. pre-tax return required  .. ,if ·a  firm 
wishes to secure 'a·  Stl  Fofit S:tt~ tax  •. , 'The  foli~ing scenarioa'·i~tia'.~overela  . 
a  firm  from  the  co~ntry in question  investing  in.that country  (first 
'  '  .  column) 1  " 
a  foreign  firm  inveQtinq in the· country in question  (second ·cpl~~)  1 
a  firm  from the-country in question.inveating-abroad  (third column). 
.  -(~  ..•.  ~  '  ~  (  '  .  ' 
On  the  basis  of  these  results, 
column)  and  a  •capital  export 
calculat..,d. 
•  '  ..,~~·  f  7  '  ,  ... 
a  •capi~al, import. inc~ntive  ratio':  (fourth 
incent·ive  ratio'  (fifth · coli.unn) · ·can -be 
Consideration  of  the  capital  import  incentive  ratio  shows  that  in  moat 
countries  ·foreign  'firms  are  more  highly-taxe~  than  domestic  . ·fir~t~s, 
particularly in'Gre.;_ce.  However,  Portugal.and,  in.'particular,.Ireiand favour 
'foreign  firms. '  In· Germany,  dOmestic and foreign .firms are'  ·treated, ln;;t;~·e. same 
fashion. 
Conversely,  the capital export incentive ratio is particularly high· in Germany 
and,  to  a  lesser  degree,  in  Denmark.  There  are  fiscal  disincentives to the 
export of capital in Ireland,  Italy and- Greece.  _: 
B.  Bxperte•  recommandatiqns 
The  harmonization  of  corporate  tax profits  is desirable,  not  with  a  view  to 
making  conditions  of  competition  between  firms  in the  Community  more_  ~a1 4 , 
but  in  order · to  ensure  that  ratioDal  choices  can  be  made  regarding  the 
location'of investments  • 
.. The  only  means  of  achieving  'double neutr'ality'  (in  re.spect  of. the, e~port and' 
import of capital)  would be to standardize the rules governing the taxation of 
corporate profits throughout the community.  · 
With  ·this  in  mind,  the  experts  advocate  that  corporate  taxation  should 
':lltimately  become,,  either  in  full  or  in  part,  a  Coalmunity  tax.  They  also 
suggest,  on the grounds of economic  i"atio~ality, either  incorporatin~  .. interest 
4  The  reasoning  here  is  similar  to  that  put . forward  in connection with 
employers•  social- insurance  contributions.  The  eharacteri'stics  of 
corporation  tax  must  not  be  con.sidered  in  isolation  when  j~udging  the 
comparative  return  on  investments:  in  .the  long  : ~erm,·  higher 
corporation tax must be reflected ·in lower ·labour costs and;· therefore, 
a  greater  pre-tax  return  on  inve'stment.·  However,  it st·J:ll  hold~ true 
that ·:a  country' which ·lowers  lt~s .tax  rates temporarily offers , its· firms 
a  competitive  advantage  (on- condition  that' several .countries  do  riot 
take the same decision).  ·  ·  · 
- 22  -charges  into  the  taxable  profit  or  baaing  the  tax  on  the  total  volume  of 
capital used by  firms. 
However,  the  complete  standardization  of  corporation  tax  in  the  community 
would  deprive  Member  states  of  the  option  of  altering  that  tax  other  than 
through  the  application of  a  COmmunity  decision.  This  would  perhaps be going 
too  £ar,  since  many  economic  activities  fall  within  what  is  known  as  the 
sheltered  sector which  is protected  from  foreign  competition.  The  behaviour 
of  firms  in this sector would  not  be  affected by  international disparities in 
taxation systems which concern only transnational economic activities. 
A  less  ambitious  objective  than  the  complete  standardization  of  tax  systems 
would  be  that  of  making  taxation  more  neutral  in respect  of  the  location  of 
investment.  In  this  rega~d,  it would  be desirable  for  any  firm operating  in 
a  country,  whether  as  a  dpmestic  firm  or  the  aubeidiary  of  a  foreign  firm, 
should be taxed fully and  ~xclusively in  accordanc~ with the tax  system of the 
country  in  question,  and ,l that  only  its  profits  generated  in  that- country 
should be  so taxed. 
- 23  -V.  VAT  AND  EXCISE  DUTIES 
A.  Current situation 
VAT  plays  an  important  role  in  the  tax  systems  of all the  European'~untries 
(Table  Ro.  20),  particularly  in  France,  where  in  1987  the  proceeds  from  VAT 
reached  8.7%  of  GOP  (i.e.  42%  of  state  revenue).  VAT  is  least  important  in 
Italy  (5.3%  of  GOP  and  23%  of state revenue). 
Excise  duties  are  also  a  substantial  source  of  revenue:  4.1%  of  GOP  (and 
almost  20%  of  state  revenue,  almost  as  much  as  VAT)  in  the  United  Kingdom; 
2.9%  of  GOP  (and  almost  20%  of state revenue)  in France;  2.6%  of GOP  in Italy, 
2.4%  in Germany  and  2%  in Sptin. 
~ 
1.  VAT 
The  first  difference  which  ~merges  from  a  compar~son of  national  VAT  systems 
concerns the rates  (Table  Ho~  21).  The  standard rate ranges  from  12%  in Spain 
and  Luxembourg  to  23%  in  Irrland  (14%  in Germany,  15%  in the United  Kingdom, 
18.6%  in France  and  19%  in Italy). 
'. 
Denmark  is unique  in applyinV only  a  single VAT  rate of  22%. 
The  reduced  rates  (certain  countries  apply  several)  are  set  at  zero  in  the 
United  Kingdom,  5.5%  in France,  6%  in Spain  and  7%  in Germany. 
Six  countries operate an  increased rate applicable to certain  luxury  products 
and,  in most  cases,  cars.  This  increased  rate is .25%  in France,  33%  in Spain 
and  38%  in  Italy.  However,  it must  be  added  that  cars are often  subject,  in 
addition to  VAT,  to  a  specific  tax  which,  in the  United  Kingdom  for  example, 
raises  the  total  volume  of  taxes  on  car  purchases  to  the  same  level  as  in 
France. 
In  addition  to  these  VAT  rate  disparities,  there  are  differences  in  the 
distribution of products  among the rates,  particularly in respect of petroleum 
products:  Table Ho.  22 gives  a  number  qf examples •  . ,,, 
Although  the  VAT  assessment  basis  is  a~ready  90%  harmonized,  sizeable 
disparities remain  in certain sectors  such  as telecommunications  and  passenger 
transport. 
Finally,  certain  countries  are  lese  restrictive  than  others  in  respect  of 
rights to deduct,  for  example  for  private cars,  fuel,  entertainment  expenses 
and business travel. 
2.  Excise duties 
The  structure  of  excise  duties  varies  considerably  from  one  country  to 
another. 
- 25  -As  regards the taxation of petroleum producto  (~abla No.  23)5 ,  on the one 
there  are  countries  such  as  Germany  and  tha  United  Kingdom  which 
relatively  modest  taxes  on  petrol  and  make  diesel  only  slightly 
attractive  and,  on  the  other  hand,  countries  such  as  France  and,  above 
Italy which tax petrol heavily and  apply reduced rates to diesel. 
hand· 
levy 
more 
all, 
As  regard~ alcoholic  beverages,  the,..tax  disparities divide  Europe  into  three 
areas:  the  north  of  Europe,  in  particul.'ar  the  United  Kingdom,  applies  very 
high  rates  of  duty  to  alcoholic  beverages.;  the centre,  in particular Germany 
and  France,  apply  moder~te rates;  the eouth  appli~s·very low  rates or no  duty 
at all.  Rate  structures tend  systematically to favour  local  p~oduction (wine 
or beer as appropriate). 
The  taxation  of  tobacco  products  is  more  uniform  in  overall  terms.  The 
proportion of the final  pr~ce of cigarettes made  up·by  duty varies relatively 
little  between  countries:  it  generally  &mounts  to  between  70  and  75". 
However,  the  structure  of  the  duties  creates  a  distinction  between  prOducer 
countries  and  importing  ~tries.  As  producers  of  dark  tobacco,  whose 
production costs  are  low,  :France  and  the  southern  European  countries apply, a 
system  of  ad  valorem  taxation  which  favours  national  produc~s.  COnversely, 
tobacco-importing  countri~e  place  greater  reliance  on  fixed- duties·,  .which 
favours  light tobaccos,  whose  production costa are higher. 
B.  Budgetary  impact of the approxta&tion of  indir~ taxation 
In  December  1989,  the  commission  abandoned  its initial plan of  standardizing 
excise duties  around  Community  averages.  It is  now  proposing  to fix  minimum 
rates,  applicable  as·  of  1  January .-1993,  and  to  secure  'target  rates'  in the. 
'  - )- '\  1y  ' 
longer term,  but without setting firm 4ates.  The  imp~ct of  the~e propoaals on 
the tax  revenue  of  the main  Member  States  should, ultimately be very small,  at 
least in the foreseeable  future. 
The  harmonization of national VAT  systems raises more  problems. 
Once  the  Member  states  agre~d,·  d~f!Jpite  the _  reserv(ltions  expressed  by  the 
commission,  that  the disappearance-9f  fiscal ·frontiers  on- 1  January  1993  did 
not  require  the  transition,  on  the' ~ame date,  from  the syst'm of taxation  in 
the  country of destination to that  of  taxation in the country of ortgin,  the 
fixing of  a  new  date  for this switch became  a  key negotiating issue.  However, 
this  matter  does  not  bear  very  closely  on  that. of  the  appro.zd.mation of  VAT 
rates,  which will  now  be examined. 
5  In  addition  to  the  duty  ratas  applied  in  th12  main  countries  of  the 
community,  this table  seta  out  the  minimum  rates  which  the  Commission 
proposes  to  accept  .~ of  1  .:tanuaey  1990  and  the target rates \11hich  it 
plans to aim at in the  long term. 
- 26  -1.  The  planned approximations of VAT  rates 
The  commission  has  proposed  that  national  VAT  systems  should  in  principle 
operate  only  two  rates:  a  standard  rate,  between  14  and  20,,  and  a  reduced 
rate,  between 4  and 9•6 • 
Exemptions  may  be  granted,  in particular  for  oars  which,  as  they are subject 
to  registration  formalities,  may  have  specific  taxes  applied  to  them 
equivalent to an  increased rate of VAT. 
Moreover,  aince  the  approximation  of  rates  is  only  required  for 
'transferable'  products,  it  is  quite  possible  that  electricity  supply  and 
telephone  services,  for  e~ample,  might  bo  taxed  at differing rates  according 
to the country concerned.  · 
At  all  events,  the  strict harmonization  of  VAT  rates  is not  necessary.  It 
must  be  borne  in  mind  t~at  almost  all  transfrontier  trade  is  carried  out 
between  firms  subject  to  VAT  which,  since  they  recover  the  tax  on  their 
purchases,  take into  consi~eration only 'the prices net of tax.  Moreover,  mail 
order  sales  and  purchases  carried  out  by  non-taxable  major  institutions 
(banks,  hospitals,  public  authorities)  could  be  subject  to  specific 
arrangements. 
2.  Budgetary impact of approximations of VA~ rates 
The  approximations  of  VAT  rates  proposed  by  the  Commission  would  raise  the 
most  serious  budgetary  problems  in  Denmark.  The  transition  from  the current 
system  (single  rate  of  22\)  to  one  comprising  a  standard  rate of  18%  and  a 
reduced  rate  of  9%  would  cut  30\  from  the proceeds  from  VAT,  i.e.  roughly  9\ 
of state revenue. 
If,  as  the  experts  suggest,  lrraDCG  merely  implemented  a  strict  miniJtlum  of 
harmonization measures,  the cost could be limited to 2.5 billion BCU.  In this 
case,  cars would still have to be taxed at a  higher rate,  possibly through the 
application of a  registration tax,  and slsctricity and  domestic  fuel,  intended 
in  principle to  be  taxed  at  the  reduced  rate under  the Commission  proposals, 
would  have  to  remain  at the  standard  rate,  since  trade  in these  products  is 
protected from  international competition. 
The  cost of  a  broader harmonization could reach 4.5 bn  BCU. 
In  Germany,  whose  VAT  system  comprises  two  rates,  14\  and  7\,  the  changes 
would  entail  a  slight widening of  the  assessment  basis  and the application of 
the  reduced  rate  to  products  currently  subject  to  the  standard  rate,  this 
would  lead  to  a  loss  in  revenue  totalling  1.  0  bn  ECU.  However,  if,  at  a 
later stage of  negotiations,  the Member  states agreed  to narrow the range for 
6  The  Member  States  have  expressed  their  intention  of  laying  down  a 
narrower  range  for  the  standard  rate  (Council  meeting  of  18  December 
1989).  However,  given  the  lack  of  precise  details,  the  calculations 
referred to  below  are  based  on  the  Commission  proposals.  The  Council 
wishes to lay down,  by the end of 1991,  the list of products subject to 
the  reduced  rate.  A  zero-rate  would  continue  to  apply  to  a  limited 
range of  items. 
- 27  -the  standard  rate  ( 14%  to  20%) ,  this  rate  would  have  to  be  increased  in 
Germany. 
In Italy,  the transition  from  the current  four-rate  system  (ranging  bet~een 4 
and  38%)  to  a  two-rate  system  could  be  achieved without  affecting the"budget 
by applying  a  standard rate of 16\ and  a  reduced rate of 4t. 
'  As  regards  the  United  Kingdoa,  budg~tary problems  do  not  arise,  sine~ it ia 
tqe  continued  application,  of  a  aero  rate  which  is  at  issue.  P~oducts 
benefiting  from  this  rate  account  for  aliDOat  30'- of  household  expenditure. 
Their taxation at a  rate of  4%  would  be  inflationary and would generate a  tax 
take of  4.6  bn  ECU.  However,  it is perhaps.not essential to abandon the zero 
rate,  since  the  goods  to  which  it  applies  are  not  likely  to  be  traded 
internationally in any  vol~. 
In . Spain,  the  standard  rlilte  should  be  increased  from  12%  to  14%  and  the 
increased rate  (33%)  shoul~ be  ~andonea.  These  two measures  would lead  to a 
slight increase in tax  rev~nue. 
several  chapters  in the experts'  report  have  not  been dealt with in the above 
sununary. 
They cover: 
local ta:zation; 
the taxation of houeeholda  •  financial  aeuHtta; 
community taxation; 
tax reforms  implemented in the major OBCD  cOuntries; 
the  macroeC:oaaaic  censeqaences  of  the  COiillplete  standardization  of 
indirect taxation. 
* 
•  * 
* 
- 28  -B  ••••••••••  Belgium 
DE  •••••••••  Denmark 
D  • • • • • • • • • • 
GR  • • ..  • • • • • • 
BSP  •••••••• 
p  •••••••••• 
IRL 
ITA  •••••••• 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
LUX  •••••••••  Luxembourg 
RL  ••••••••••  Netherlands 
PDR  •••••••••  Portugal 
UK  ••••••••••  United Kingdom 
BUR  •••••••••  European average 
USA  •••••••••  United States 
JAP  ••••••••••  Japan 
Table No.  1 
Level of and trends in CO!Dpllaory deduction rates 
- OBCD  def.laitiou -
I  Variations 
I  Level  in 
I  1965  from  1965  from  1973  from  1979] 
I  to.1973  to 1979  to 1987  I 
I  B .........  30.8  6.6  7.1  1.6  I 
I  OK  ........  29.9  12.5  2.1  7.5  I 
I  D .........  31.6  4.7  1.4  -0.1  I 
I GR  ••••••••  20.6  2,.6  6.9  7.3  I 
I ESP ••••••••  14.5  4.3  4.6  9.6  I 
I  F  • • • • • • • • •  34.5  0.5  5.2  4.6  I 
I  IRL .......  26.0  5.2  0  8.7  I 
I  ITA  •••••••  25.5  -1.1  2.2  9.6  I 
I  LOX  .......  30.4  2.7  7.1  3.6  I 
I  NL  ........  33.2  8.6  3.2  3.0  I 
. 1  POR  •••••••  18.4  3.5.  4.1  5.4  I 
I  UK  ••••••••  30.4  1.0  1.4  4.7  I 
I  I 
EUR  .......  29.5  2.6  2.9  4.6 
USA  .......  25.9  2.8  0.3  1.0 
JAP .......  18.3  ~.2  1.9  5.8 
Source:  OECD 
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(\ of GOP) 
Level  in 
1987 
46.1 
52.0 
37.6 
37.4 
33.0 
44.8 
39.9 
36.2 
43.8 
48.0 
31.4 
37.5 
39.6  I 
j· 
30.0  I 
30.2  I Table N;).  2 
(b!puJsrn:y dsductlcms am pillic ~Jbza:t 
- l'lrlUcmal ~  -
(%of QDP) 
I'  I  I  I 
I  1 a::np,, eacy  1  Public  'J.Ul1IIL  I SOCial  INmt  l~nstl 
I  I daductions I  SECtor  IA+B!lll  I J:JeMfits I 1.nt::ar:est  I ~- I· 
I  I  I  deficit '!D+I+FI  I payments  I  ·  t:l.U."8  I· 
I  I  (A)  I  (B)  I  (C)  I  (D)  I  (!)  I  (F)  I 
I B  {l)  •••••  45.7  7.2  I  52.9  I  21.4  10.5  21.0  I 
I DK  (1)  ••••  52.3  '1·0  !  50.3  I  16.4  4.5  29.4  I 
I D  (1)  •••••  41.2  t·B  I  43.0  I  16.0  2.8  4.2  I 
L  GR  (1)  ••••  35.2  ~.00  I  47.2  I  13.8  7.2  26.2  .I 
I EsJ?  <2>  •••  30.9  p-1  I  37.0.  I  16.2  3.1  17.7  I 
I F  (l)  •••••  44.6  ~.o  I  .116.6  I  . 21.9  2.1  22.6  I. 
I IRL (2) ••••  41.0  1,1.8  I  52.8  I  •17.0  9.5  26.3  I 
1  ·rm (l)  •••  35.6  U.2  I  46.8  I  17.3  7.3  22.2  I 
I wx <2>  •••  41.6  - 2.7  I  38.9  I  19.5  1.1  18~3  I 
L  Nl:.  <l>  ••••  47.3  6.5  I  53.8  I  26.4  5.2  22.2  I 
,  •. PCR  (2}  •••  34.5  6.4  I  40.9  I  11.6  8.8  20.5'  I 
I ilK  <2>  ••••  38.4  2.4  I  40.8  I  14.0  3.0  23.8  I 
I  I  I 
1 tm <1>  •••  30.2  2.6  I  32.8  I  10.8  3.6  18.4 
I JAP  <l>  •••  30.0  -o.6  .I  29.4  I  11.8  4.4  13~2 
(l)  1987  (2)  1986  SOUrca.s  CI!XD 
(3) MinJs sign signifies surplus 
Table M:>.  3 
Role of ganaml goveoliiliiii bl scc1al ttatl.Bfet:s 
(t of GOP) 
'  ' 
I 
SOCial  insurance oontr.ib.ltk.ns  Social benefits  I  ll' 
1 Ircluded  I  lPai.d over I  I  I 
lin  I  ot:herB  Tot8l  lbf govern-I Others  I '1\Xal.  I 
I CXIllpllsxy I  lrcents  .,  I  I 
I dedl.x:tions  I  I  , I  (3)  I  I . 
I D (1)  •••••  14.0  I  5.00  19.0  16.0  I  4.4  I  20.4 
I ESP  (2)  •••  11.9  I  3.0  14.9  16.2  I  2.3  I  18.5 
I F  (1)  •••••  19.2  I  3.3  22.5  21.9  I  1.7  I  23.6 
I rm <1>  12.5  I  4.4  16.9  17.3  .I  4.4  I  21.7 
I UK  '(2)  ••••  6.9  I  3.6  10.5  14.0  I  4.5  I . 18.5 
I  I  I 
1 tm <1>  ...  8.7  6.0  14.7  10.8  I  6.8  I  17. 
(1)  1987  (2)  1986  Sow:oe:  QliXD 
(3) M.xtual asa:JCiatlons, ~·  sc:hema.s,  othar private funds 
-30-B  1  • • • • • • • • 
DK  •..••• 
D  1• • • • • • • • 
GR  •••••• 
ESP  ••••••• 
F  • • • • • • • • • 
IRL 
ITA  ••••••• 
NL  •••••••• 
UK  •••••••• 
BUR 
1  Gross debt 
Table No.  4 
Ret pgbllc debt 
1980 
69.3 
33'.5 
14.3 
27.7 
7'.8 
14."3 
78.0 
53.6 
24.9 
47.5 
27.8 
Source:  OECD 
Table No.  5 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I  . I 
I 
I 
(%  of GDP) 
1988 
124.5 
56.1 
23.5 
71.5 
31.1 
25.5 
137.6 
92.4 
55.4 
38.4 
43.2 
Primary deficit and primary au.rplua 
required to coDtrol tbe ~ 
B  • • • • • • • 
DK  •••••• 
D  • • • • • • • 
GR  •••••• 
ESP  ••••• 
p  •••.•.. 
IRL  ••••• 
ITA·  ••••• 
NL  •••••• 
UK  • • • • • • 
Primary deficit 
in 1988 
2.4 
4.3 
0.3 
-7.2 
-0.4 
0.7 
2o8 
-2.5 
-0;.4 
3.3 
(\ of GDP) 
1  Primary surplus required  I 
·  minimum/maximum  I 
1. 9/2.5 
0.9/1.2 
0.2/0.3 
o. 7/1.1 
0.3/0.5 
0.4/0.5 
1.4/2.1 
1.6/2.0 
0.9/1.2 
0.6/0.8 
1  The  results  are  presented  in  the  form  of  a  target  range  reflecting  the 
various  hypotheses  concerning the rate of growth  of  GDP  and the level of 
interest rates 
Source:  OFCE  - CEPII 
- 31  -Table No.  6 
(\of  GOP)' 
1970  1987  I 
I Public  I other  'lbtal  I PubUo  I otbar  I  'ltltal  I 
I expmiiturel ~- I expn:U.- I ~- 1·  , L . 
I  I ture  I t:ure  I ture  I  I 
I D .••..••••  4.2  ~-4  5.6  I  6.3  1.7  I  8.0  I 
I F ••••••••••  4.3  ~.8  6:1  I  6.7  2.0  I  8.7  I 
I ~  ••.•..•  4.8  p.1  s.s  I  5.7  1•5  I  7.2  'I 
I tJI(  ••••••••  3.9  0.6  4.5  I  5.3  0.8  I  6.1  I 
f  t.SA. ••••••••  2.8  4.8  7.6  6.0  5.1  11.1 
I JlfP• •••••••  3.0  1.6  4.6  s.o  1.9  6.9 
- 32  -' ' '1'8bl.e No.  7 
•••• balds 
(\of QlP) 
I  B  I - DK  "  I  D  I  ca  liSP  I .  .,  I  rm  HL  I  tlK  lmiR 
I lDl'iEKID ncH:  I 22.0  27.5,  I 18.4  I  ·10.8  I 10.3  I 13.9  I 13.3  1 22.6  I 15.1  1 16.o 
I  I  I  I  I  . I  I  'I  I 
I in:::ludin:;r:  I  I  I  I  I  1'- I  I 
1 -Income tax •••••••••••  I 15.1  25.6  I 1o.9  I  4.6  I  7.0  I  5.7  I  9.5  9.5  1 10.o  I  9.6 
I - El:lpl.oyees'  social  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
I  insuraooe cxntrib.ttials I  5.1  1.0  I  6.1  I  5.3  I  2.0  I  1 · 2.4  9.0  I  3.1  I  4.5 
I a::mmAm m:x:ME 
I 
I <oorpxatial 
I tax>  ••••••••••••••••••  3.0  2.3  1.9  1.7  2.2  2.3  3.8  3.7  4.0  2.8 
I ~  cx:i9':s  •••••••••  9.4  1.3  7.2  5.7  9.1  ·I  13.o  I  8.9  8.2  3.5  8.2 
I Other prcxb:ti.al ooata • •  I  I  I  ,  I 
I  I  0.2  1.5  0.8  0.2  0.1  I  2.1  I  0  0.6  2.6  1.1  I 
I 
I~  :PRI~ •••••••  I 1o.5  17.0  9.1  I 16.7  9.7  I 12.1  9.1  I 11.4  I 11.1  I 10.1  .I 
I in:::ludin:;J:  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
I - ~  ................  I  7.2  9.8  5.9  I 10.0  5.6  I  8.7  5.3  I  7.9  I  6.0  I  6.7  I 
I - Excise duties ••••••  I  2.1  6.7  2.4  I  4.8  _2.0  I  2.9  2.6  I  2.7  I  4.4  I  3.0  I 
I 
I OI1iEJ'6  •••••••••••••••  1.0  2.4  0.2  I  2.3  1.6  0.8  1.1  1.6  0.6  0.8 
I  romr., •••••••••••••••  I 46.1  I  52.0  I 37.6  I 37.4  ..1  33.o  I 44.8  I 36.2  I 48.o  I 37.5  I 39.6 
-33-Table No.  8 
'.rJ::ads in a:x:ial Jnsurarx:a ......,..,..bd"iCCB_ ~  ]970 to 1987 
(\of,  <Di) 
.. 
I  I  mrpl.oya:s  I  CXZll:.rib.ttia  u  lilTplayees' ~ 
I.  " 
I  I  Variati.al  I  II  Variaticil  ·I 
I  I I.eYel in  Isvel. in  II  I.eYel in  I.eYel  ~· 
I  I  1970  I  tran 1970  I  fran 1980  I  1987  II  1970  I  fran 1970  I  £rem l98Q  I  1987 
I.  I  Ito  1980  Ito  · 1987  I  u  Ito  1980  Ito  1987  ·I 
f  •  ~ 
I  I  ;  '  II  I  I  I 
lB  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  5.9  I  + 2.5  I  +  ~-0  9.4  II  3.2  I  + 0.6  I  + 1.3  I  5.1 
ID  ••••••••••  5.3  I  + 1.9  I  Q  7.2  II  4.5  I  + 1.3  I  + 0.3  . I  6.1 
lc:it  •••••••••  3.7  I  + 0.7  I  +.0.9  5.3  II  3.3  1 . + 1.0.  I  + ·1._0.,  1:.  5,.3 
jESP  • • • • •  .• • •  5.1  I  + 4.0  I  0  9•1  II  1.3  I  +·1.3  I  - 0.6  I  2.0 
IF  •.•.••.•••  9.3  I  + 2.6  I  + 0.3  12.2  II  2.4  I  + 2.2  I  + 0.9'  I  5.5. 
I  :IRI, I ••••••••  1.4  I  + 1.8  I  + 0.3  3.5  .II  1.2  I  + 0.4  I  + 0.4  I  2.0 
Jrm  ......... ·I  7.9  I  + 0.7  I  + 0.1  8.7  II  2~.0  I  + 0.1  I  + 0.3. ·I  2.4 
+  1~4  .,  '  9.6  lz:n,  · · · · · · · · ·  I  6.2  I  + 0.2  I  0  '  8.2•  '1'1  5.8  I  + 1.8  ]_. 
lt.IK.  · · • • · · · · ·  I  .  2.7  I  + 0.9  I  0  3:.6  II  2.3  I.  0  I  + 0.8  . I  3.1 
-34-I, 
I 
I 
Table No.  9 
Social insurance contribution rates 
8  ........  . 
D  • • • • • • • • • 
GR  •••••••• 
ESP  ••••••• 
p  ••••••••• 
"IRL  ••••••• 
ITA  ••••••• 
NL  • • ~ • • • • • 
POR  ••••••• 
UK  •••••••• 
Employers •  I  ,  Bmployees' 
contributions  I ·conbributions 
I, 
27.7  12.0 
1~.0  18.0· 
2~.2  13.3 
3Q.6  6.0 
3~.5  16.-4 
1~.4  7.8 
4$.1  8.2. 
24.5  34.1 
24.5  11.0 
10.5  (b)  9.0  (b) 
ceiling 
(' of average 
worker's salary) 
130/170 
180 
220 
130  (a) 
.170 
120/160/170 
150  (C) 
(a)  Solely for old-age pension contributions·under basic scheme. 
(b)  Reduced rates'for very  low wage-earners. 
(c)  Solely for employers•  contributions. 
B, • • •,• • • • • • 
DK  •••••••• 
D  • • • • • • • • • 
ESP  ••••••• 
p  ••••••••• 
ITA  ••••••• 
NL  •••••••• 
UK  •••••••• 
Sources  CEPII 
Table No.  10 
Value-added gain sharing 
(·1987) 
Wage  and social costa 
52.9 
56.5 
53.6 
45.8 
53.0 
45.2 
53.6 
54.9 
- 35  -
(' of value added) 
Gross operating surplus! 
36.5 
27.1 
36.3 
45.6 
34.5 
47.8 
36~9 
31.0 Table No. ll 
W8gB coats and dJ sposeble 1nccll8 aft.l!r tax 
far: a 1G:Jra: moaivi!ll) an arm:aga ._. 
(Jia'n.1al.  ear:ninga, iri JID1) 
<' of (l)p 
I  I .  . I  Decb::tia1 tatS 
I  I  Dispcaabl.e irVx:ITe  I  -~, 
OJst to fiml  I  Gr:oss wage  I  Net  '  '  waga  aftar tax 
I·  I  'I  ~I ~ 
, (A)  I  (B)  I  (C)  (D)  I  A. I  A 
'  IB  ........  '22 360  I  15 650  ·J  13• st;o  ll6oo  ·r  '38 + 48 
)Ill{  ••••••••  24  280  1- 23  900  I  23300  14 640  I  4 ·1  40 
)D  •••••••  ~.  ' 23  670  I  2Q100  I  i6SJO  14 840  I  .30 I  37 
lc;Et  ••••••••  8,400  I  ~sso  I  5  540  5 340  I  341  36 
li:SP'  •••••••  l3 .750  1  ~600  I  ~~  '  9210  I  ·28  ·1  ·  33 
'  l.094o  ~.42 ·I·  IP  •••••••••  18 880  I  13 200  I  10 940  ·I  42 
I  IR[, •••••••  13  770  I  12  250  I  U'600  918  1- 16.,1  34 
I~··--:····  19  740  I  13  200  . I  12  250  10 040  I  381  49 
II.LDC  •••••••  19  110  I  '16 630.  '  I  14  710  14  570  I  331  34 
lm.  ••••••••  22280  I  17  800  I  13  400  u  820  J  :40  I.  46 
IPCit.  •••••••  4550  I  3  650  I  3.250  3 030  I  '29 .1  33 
ltJK.  ••••••••  18 820  I  16 450  I  15 000  12  170  I  181  32 
(1)  Incx:ma tax has been cal.ollan:r' for a  sJ.ngie-in::x.lla·c.Xq;lle with twO  chlldren. 
soorce:  CB:D,  CFCE  calollatims 
TableR). 12 
BatJD tet sen tba IUII:Iar of pa:sws ouar 65 
an:! the actbe ~ati~  (16-65) 
<'> 
1980  1990  2000  I  2010 
I B  ••••••••  '21.9  I  21.2.  .  I  21.9  I  23.6  I 
I Ill(' •••••••  22.2  I  22.5  I  ' 21.5  I  24.3  I 
I D  ••••••••  23.4  I  22.3  I  25.4  I  JQ.S  I 
I e~t .••••••  20.5  I  18.3  I  22.7  I  25.8  I 
I 1!Sl ••••••  17.2  I  19.4.  '  I  21.9  I  22.9  I 
I F  ••••••••  21.9  I  20.9"  I  23.4  I  24.5  I 
I zm,  ••••••  18.2  I  18.5  I  16  .• 9  I  16.4  I 
I I'm. ••••••.  20.7.  I  '  20.2  .  I  22.6  I  25.7'  1,· 
I m...  •••••••  17.4  I  18.4  I  19.8  I·  22.0  I 
1 :E:a:t  ••••••  16.2  1  17.9  I  20.7  I  21~3  I 
I 1lK  •••••••  23.3  'I  23.0  I  22.3  I  22.7  I 
8alroel CB:D 
-36-Table lb. l3 
·  MFM:i oecuiCIDic iDpct of a  1\\ amual mcllnctian· in uplOJ&n" alcial !mm:ance cx:mtritut.kms 
offset by a riaB Jn dsducttms fmD hcimldlo1d !nccaB in France, ltal.y ancl8,p!Wl 
(\ di.splritiaB by ~i&an  with Ol:llSit&nt mtes) 
I  Oelmany  I J'rarlCa  I Italy  I C!thsr JB:: 
I  I  I  I 
I  ,--
I  1st year  14th year .I 1st }'I8Br  14th yaar tl.St year  14th year  jlst year  14th year 
. I  '  IGDP  (Volute) ••••••••••  - 0.0  I  - 0.4  I  - 0.1  - 0.3  o.o  0.4  I  - 0.1  I 
1  Expxts (Vol\.ltS  >  •••••  - 0.1  I  - Or1  I  - 0.1  - 0.1  0.0  0.4  I  - 0.1  I 
1  :rnpxts (Vol\.ll'e)  •••••  - 0.1  I  - 0,3  I· - o.3  - 0.8  ,.;.  0.3  -·o.1  1  ··~ o.1  'I 
I  Cl:lnsurrer prices ••••••  0.0  I  - 0.1  I  - 0.3  - 0.2  - 0.4  - 2.4  I_ -..t.~  r 
l~p:w;rr  .  t  I  I  I 
jof b:::useholds  ••••••••  - o.o  I  - 0.2  I  - 0.3  - 0.1  - 0.1  - 0.5  I  I 
ICl.ln'ent  fol:eign  I  I  I  I 
!balance  I  I  I  I 
J(\ ~GOP) •••••••••••  - o.o  I  - o.o  I  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.1  I  o.o  I 
N.B. 'l1lia table OOafl  not incl.ude z:esR1l.ts  far the Ulited JCingd:m,  sin::e tbD inijo.rity do not differ 
significantly £%an  mro.  spain is included in 'ot:bslr: me• • 
Table M:>.  14 
. - 0.2 
- 0.3 
- 0.7 
- 1.2 
0.1 
I 
I 
-! 
I' 
I 
.. I 
I 
.  t 
I 
·I 
I 
I 
I 
---, 
I.  Rmi:ler of bands  I  Ml!lx.imml  I  MaximJm rate thl:eShold  (1 )  as  I 
I  I  mt.e  . I  aultiple of averaga w::xrller' 8 •sa.lary  I 
I  I  (t)  I  I 
B  • • • • •.  • .. • •  13  I  70.8  I  . 7.3  I 
me.  •••••••••  3  I .  68  I  1.1  I 
D  • • • .. • • • • •.  00  I  56  l  3.1  I  ·' 
~  ........  17  I  56  I  s.s  I 
F  • • • .. • • •••  •  13·  I  56.8  I  2.:5  I 
:rm:..  ••••••••  4  I  58  I  1.0  'I 
l'1!A.  .........  8  I  so  I  15.0  ·I 
LUX  • • ••• • •.  25  I  56  I  1.7  I 
m.,  •••••••••  10  I  72  I  5.5  I 
tiK •••••••••  3  I  40  I  1.9  :I 
(1 )  For a sil'gle Jl'al1. 
-31-jwage .as nultiple of  I 
I  average worker's  I 
·IW9ge  I 
l  I (a) 
IB  ..............  c ••••••  jl8 
jii< ..........  0  •••••••••  140 
ID  ....•....•.•.•.....• I 16 
fESt'>  •••••••••••••  "'  0  •••  I  6 
IF  •.••.••..••••••••••• ·I  3 
~~  .................. 
)I'm ••••••••••••••••  ". 
rra  .. ;  ................ 
)tJI(  •••••••••••••••••oo 
1  Tax paid 
Net, Wage 
127 
I 14 
I  7 
jl8 
Table No.  15 
lllvt:siCage  :ad:.lElla of t:a paid by a lllirlgl.e maia \iC!dtmlt'z 
(a)  .blcallfll ta  r:at;;J-
(b) aua::all ~  rlllt:FJ1 
0.7  1  '-· 
2 
I 
I 
(b)  (a)  (b)  I  (a)  (b).  (a) 
43  25  48  I  38  57  I  40 
42  45  46  I  56  57  j,  60 
42  20  45  I  .31  48'' r  40 
3J  12  31  I  20  42  I  24 
42  8  45  I  16  50  I  21 
40  34  '46  I  46  !54.'  I  so 
45  l8  48- I  24  '  52  j·  27 
•44  12  48  I  26  53'  i  ·39 
31  21  35  I  24  35  I  29 
3  ., 
L-
J. 
(b)  I  (a)-
58  I  ·48 
60  ··I' 63 
I  -· 46.-';  .50 
41  I  ..  31  ; 
53  I  40 
55  .  , 53'. 
·54  I  32 
. ·ss  I  52 
39·  I  33 
2  Incxlne taX + erplovers' and ra:pp.\91fP'  §!QXial .inSurain} <X?Ptr!but~· 
5 
'. 
Gross Wage+~·  ~·  Jnsw:'l!ir!os  o:rntiihrt:~·  .  "  .. 
Table !i). 16 
(%) 
··-
(b) 
~-
·63 
' ' 51 
41 :· 
57 
57' 
57 
159 
.;41 
1\veit:age rat:ea of tax paid by cblble-izloaals ccup1e w.ltb. bo  chi.l.c:kenl 
(a)  inccnle tax i:itr.sl 
(b) OllfEal.l. ~  'DiJt:l}  / 
;(\) 
·j'l\r.lo wage8  as nultiple  0.7 + o.s  I  1 +'0.7  2 + 1.4  3 + 2;1  I  5 + 3.5 
jot average ¥a:"ker's  I  ·I 
IWi99  (a)  (b)  I (a)  (b)  {a)  (b)  (a)  '(b)  I  (a);  '. {b) 
I.  t 
'•"  "  .. 
IB  ........•.••........ I 14  40  123  46  I  31  56,  44  ss·  I  ·53  67· 
flll<.••--:•••••••o••••••••  138  41  143  44  I  54  55  59  59'  I  62.  63 
ID  ••  ~ •••••••••••••••••  I 12  39  I 16  41  I  26  46  34  47  I  53.  so 
I  E:SP  ·  ••••••••••••••••••  I  2  29  l  8  34  I  18  41  ?.2  ,41  I  '29·  .  '.41 
•' 
·jF  ··~·················  I  0  40  I  4  42  I  10  46  16  '49  I  22-· 
'.  53' 
:- l.tm.,  ..  ~ ................ 122  36  1  21  40  I  41  51  47. 
,.  53  I  Sl'  . ,'54 
I  ITA ••••••••••••••••••  I 10  35  I l3  37  I  21  43  25  46  ,.  30  50 
INL  •••••••••••••••••••  I  6  41  I 10  46  I  23  51  35  53  I. 48,.  '  57 
.t_.tll{  .......................  I 16  29  .j 20  33  I  23  36  27  ,38  I  '32.  40 
1  Tax paid  2  Inoc:n'e ~  + ~.-m!S  EIQ.')}.ovees'  !1!92ial  insuzma·oatt:£~ 
·Net wage  Gross ~  + ~·  social insurance ClOI'ltriliutians 
-38-
·.I 
;··I 
·I  -
I 
I 
. I 
, I· 
I 
I 
I .  ,  .. 
'  . 
I 
'  I 
\-:.' 
1: 
I 
.I· 
·.I 
I 
I  ., 
.j.· 
f 
-I 
I 
I 
I I 
I 
I  B ....... 
I  Ill{ •••••• 
I  D ....... 
I  ~  ...... 
I  .BSP  ••••• 
I  F  ••••••• 
I  :IJ«.,  ••••• 
I  I'm.  ••••• 
I  UlX ..... 
I  m.,  •••••• 
I  tllt  ........ 
Tax rate 
43 
·so 
36(a}/SO(b) 
40  (c)/46 
35 
37(b)/42(l\) 
lO(c)/43' 
36 
34 
35 
35 
Table No.  17 
Rate af c:cep:m ion tax 
(~) 
.  . 
Tax CIEedi:t  rate 
(l} 
73 
40 
100 
100 
26 
69 
53 
-100 
0 
0 
71 
(1)  Propxtion of tax oo d~~  profits regarded as part-payn-ent of 
sha:retx>l.dars,  in:xne tax 
(a) Distributed profits  (b) leta1nad plO.fit.s 
(c)  Reduced rate 8fP] icahle to manufacturing·f.trms 
Table N;).  18 
I  01lntry in which tha invastmmt iD made 
I o:untcy of 
I origin  IB  DK  I  D  GR.  I  II'  -I  mL  ·I  rm 
I  I  I 
I  I  I 
IB  •••••••••••  5.83  6.34  6.36  I  6.36  6.53  I  7._17  I  7.24 
lm ..  ~ .......  8.35  7.02  7.64  I  9.36  7.24  I  7.84  I  9.42 
ID  •••• 0 ••••••  9.07  8.63  8.86  I. s.66  8.92  I  9.23  I  10.30 
I  <:a.  ••••••••••  6.69  7.51  6.%  I  5.55  7.73  I  8.52  I  7.27 
IF •••••••.•••  ·6.26  5.67  S.ES  I'  6.75  5.75  I  6.81  !·  7.09 
IIRL  ....•.••.  4.68  4.53  4.54, 1  4.57  4.64  I  5.08  I  4.53 
I  I'm •••••••••  6.30  6.07  6.92. I  6.52  6.24  I  6.87  I  5.60 
lm..  0  0  0  0  0  I  0  0  I  o  6.28  7.03  6.27  I  6.47  6.73  I  6.52  I  6.74 
I  :F(R,  •••••••••  6.36  6.00  6.11  I  6.13  6.28. I  6•81  I  7.04 
I  tJl(.  ...........  5.71  7.24  5.91  I  6.64  ~.u  I .  6.60  I  6.93 
....L-.. 
Salrce:  Institute for Fiscal studies 
-39-
NL 
I 
I 
'•I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I' 
I 
I 
I 
.I 
I 
I 
6.71  1 
7.38 I 
9.12  I 
7.41  I 
6.17  I 
4.77  1 
s.91  1 
6.u I 
6.43  I 
5.75  1 
(\) 
POR  UKj 
I  I 
I  I 
6.11  1  6.61  1 
8.o1 I  7.28  I 
8.21 .I  8.sl I 
1:9s I  7.82  I 
6.59  .I  6.oa I 
4.as  I  4.11  I 
6.42  I  s.97  I 
7.58 .,  6.2s I 
6.59  I·  6.2s. I 
1.02. I  6.12  1 Tahle No.  19 
'  .. ,. 
~veratial  Pre-tax return z:equired (\) fer a 511  prof_,t.t.:aft:er tax 
r Dc:ml!st:ic  r  Imlestm9nt  ~  I  Inp::rt  I :  ~  I 
I  i.nvest:ment  I  fz:tm  ~- f.  of capital' '  of· .ca;pit&l - -I 
I  I  '8broad  I  .  I 
I  (A)  I  (B)  (C)  ,.  - (A)/(B)  (A)/(C)  ! 
<' 
IB  .........  5.83  I  6.67  I  6.78  I  0.88  ·a.s6  I 
I  me.  ••• - .....  7.02  I  7.96  I  6.61  I  0.88  1.06 ,·  I 
ID  ......•.  a.86  I- 8.83  I  6.35'  - I- 1.oo·  I  ' ,.·1.4o  -_  .  I·  ,.  ,,. 
l<~t .......  5.55  I  7.59  I  6.97  I  0.73  1·.:  o.ao  L  -- I&SP  .•••••  6.10  I  6.90  r  6.91·  I  0.88  I  0.88  I  ,, ........  5.75  I  6.33  I  q.70  I  0.91  I  0.86  -I 
, IIRLt  ••••••  5.08  I  4.68  I  1.41  !  1.09  I  '0.69  I· 
lim ......  5.60  I  6.32  I  7.54  ·J  i  0.89  I·  0.74  r  '  IInX ••••..  6.19  I  6.74  1  6.69:'  I- 0.92.  I  0~93'  -'I  -•'  INL  •••••••  6.ll  I  6.63  I  6.68;,  I  0.92- - I  0.92'  I 
·/KR  ••• ...  6.59  I  6.37'  I  7.22· 
,_ 
1.03- I  0.91  I 
I  tlK.  •••••••  6.12  I  6.46  I  6.65  1- o·.95  I  0.92'  I 
-- .. L 
- .,, 
I  USA.  ••  ~ •••  5.93  6.67  I  6.76  '  -1- 0.89: 
" 
o~·aa ·. ·  'L 
,)JM>  ••••••  8.24  8.22  I  ,,rr,.  ,,.·  1.00  I  1:17  :'J 
jAwrage  I  ,.  ~  '  1- I 
I  6.35  6.88  .,  6.88  I  ;'  0.92  I  - 0~?2- I 
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GOP 
IB  ......••..•...  7.2 
IDI<  •••••••••••••  9.8 
ID  ...•..••......  5.9 
IGt .............  10.0 
I  "ESP"  ••••••••••••  5.6 
IF  ...•  :~ ........  8.7 
I  m...  ............  8.1 
I  I'm.  ••••••••••••  5.3 
(UJJC  • • • •  e  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  ~  5.9 
(ta:.  •••••••••••••  7.9 
I~  ............  6.6 
I  tJI<.  •••••••••••••  6.1 
.  (a)  Federal Rep.Jblic + I..ibx!er 
(b)  state + regions 
l B  •. • • • • • •, • • • • 
I [I( ............ 
I D  •••••••••••• 
I (;It ••••••••••• 
I ]!Sl)  ••••••••••  I F  •••••••••••• 
I Im, ••••  0 ••••• 
I I'm. •••••••••• 
~  I1.DC  •••••••••• 
I m...  ..••••••••• 
I ~  .....•..•. 
I UK .'  •••••••••• 
Table No.  20 
VAT  1-
\of  I  \of 
state :reverue  I- Q)P 
25.8  2.1 
27.8  6.7 
~.3 (a)  2.4 
;w.7  4.8 
~5.4 (b)  2.0 
• 
~1.8  2.9 
~4.4  6.9 
22.9  2.6 
21.8  4..0 
30.5  2.7 
31.8 
23.0  4.4 
Table No •.  21  -
Reduced rates  I ~rate 'I 
D-6-17  19- I 
22  -I 
7  14  I 
6  18  I 
6  12  I 
5.5  18.6  I 
o-5-10  23  I 
4-9  19  I 
3-6  l2  I 
6  18.5  I 
()-8  16  I 
0  lS  I 
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I  ll.  7  . 
I  .20.3 
I  16.0 
I  27.0 
I  19.5 
I  19.8'. 
I  24.1 
I  16.2 
I  16.6 
'I  13.8 
I 
I  :21.1 
(\) 
Increased rates  I 
25-33  I 
I 
I 
36  I 
33  I 
25  I 
I 
38  I 
1··: 
-1 
30  I 
I Table No.  22 
I itlOd~  ~~~pt'(:d.lctsl ~  -'  1- Nawspaf;et:EI  I 
- -- .  - I  I.  ' _,  -.1 
I  .. a ...............  .. 6  I - -17 
,_ 
6  1  6  r 
t II( ...........  ~.  22  I  22  1- 22  I  22'  I 
I D  •• ·~·e••••e•  7  I  ltlf  I  7  I  7  ,-
I ,l!S)  •• ·(;······  6  I  ~12  I  6  I  12  I 
I F  ••••••.  0 ••••  5.5  I  18.6  I  5.5  I  2.1  I 
I Im. •••  Ill ••••••  0  I  10'  I  0  I  10  l 
I r.l2\  .............  H  I  9-19- I  '4  I  9  1-
I UJlC  ••••11•o•••  6  I  '  f.i'  I  0_  I  12  I 
I m,  •••••••  ~ ••••  6  I  20  I  6  I  6  I 
I tJI{  •••••••••••  0  I  0  I  0  I  0  I 
Table No.  23 
Main t:a mte£1 fiat' p;tmleum ~ 
(S:U for 1000, lltres) 
SUper  Dissel  ~fuel 
I B  ·~..,·········  260_.94  ].22.31  I  0  I 
I m<.  ·  •••••••••••  472.50  236.25'  I- 236.25  I 
I D  •••••••••  0  ••  255,77  213.29  I  8.11  ~ I 
I~~ ............  367;30  138.91  I  _95.37  ·I 
I ~  ...........  188,69  30.91  I  38.42  I 
IF ·······•••~~'•  388'50  J  l?o.49- .53.21  1 
I Im..  o~:o•e9oot-o•e  361;50  279.06'  438.04  I 
I rm ..........  552.69  -~77.62  171.62  i 
I n.DC  ............  208.75  100.18_  0  -I 
I ilL······~···;  340.33  108.83  43.86  I 
I POR  ••••••••••  357.75  '161.77  23.24  I 
I tJl( ····!»······  270.69  ~.92  16.36  - I 
I QmniMiOO  I 
I prcpealn:  - -1 
-I  -~rate  337  195-205  47-53  :I 
I·- Target~  340  2oo'  50  I 
__J 
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